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The hidden costs of control
Abstract
We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principalagent game, where
the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the
agent chooses a productive activity. Our results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents
reduce their performance as a response to the principals controlling decision. Overall, the effect of
control on the principals payoff is nonmonotonic. When asked for their emotional perception of control,
most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust
and a limitation of their choice autonomy. (JEL D82, Z13)
The Hidden Costs of Control
By ARMIN FALK AND MICHAEL KOSFELD*
We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principal-
agent game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum
performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our
results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents reduce their
performance as a response to the principal’s controlling decision. Overall, the effect
of control on the principal’s payoff is nonmonotonic. When asked for their emo-
tional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive
the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice
autonomy. (JEL D82, Z13)
Principal-agent relations are typically charac-
terized by a conflict of interest. Therefore, prin-
cipals often use control and incentive devices to
eliminate agents’ most opportunistic actions.
This paper analyzes how the agent perceives the
principal’s decision to control and how this
affects the agent’s behavior. We conducted an
experiment in which a principal can decide ei-
ther to trust or to control the agent, where con-
trolling rules out the agent’s most opportunistic
actions. Our results show that the decision to
control significantly reduces the agents’ will-
ingness to act in the principal’s interest. Explicit
incentives backfire and performance is lower if
the principal controls, compared to if he trusts.
We analyze the interaction of motivation and
control in a simple and parsimonious setup. In
the game under study, an agent chooses a pro-
ductive activity x which is costly to him but
which increases the principal’s payoff. The dis-
tinguishing feature of our experiment is the
principal’s decision. Before choosing x, the
principal determines the agent’s choice set. He
can either leave the choice of x completely to
the agent’s discretion, in which case the lowest
possible choice of x is zero. Alternatively, the
principal can force the agent to choose at least a
minimum level x  0. The definition of the
agent’s choice set can be interpreted as the
degree of control implemented in the agent’s
work environment. For example, making it im-
possible for the agent to choose below x is the
equivalent of implementing various control or
monitoring devices which restrain the agent
from his most opportunistic choices. Not re-
stricting the choice set, on the other hand, rep-
resents the absence of such control mechanisms.
Alternatively, the restriction of the choice set
can also be interpreted as the outcome of a
corresponding employment contract. For exam-
ple, if x represents the amount of working hours,
x captures a minimum presence requirement.
Similarly, if x stands for the quality of a pro-
duced good or service, x is the minimum quality
the agent has to deliver.
Since x is costly to the agent, standard eco-
nomic theory predicts that the agent will choose
the lowest possible x, which is zero if the prin-
cipal does not restrict the agent’s choice set, and
x  0 if he does. Since the principal’s payoff is
increasing in x, he will therefore always be
better off controlling the agent than not limiting
the agent’s choice set. If, however, there are
agents who are intrinsically motivated to per-
form in the principal’s interest, controlling may
actually decrease performance. A potential rea-
son is that agents do not like to be restricted,
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and perceive control as a negative signal of
distrust. In addition, these agents might also
assume that the principal has low expectations.
Our main results, in fact, confirm the hypothesis
that control has an adverse effect on agents’
performance. We find that a majority of the
agents in our experiment choose a lower x if the
principal restricts rather than trusts them. We
vary the level of x in different treatments. While
we find evidence for the hidden costs of control
in all treatments, the net effect on profits turns
out to be nonmonotonic. For low levels of x,
control generates significantly lower profits
than trust; as x rises, however, control eventu-
ally breaks even. In a detailed analysis of
agents’ motives behind control aversion, we
find that agents seem to believe that principals
who control expect to receive less than those
who don’t, and that agents’ beliefs correlate
positively with their behavior. When asked for
their perception of control, most agents indicate
that they perceive the decision to control as a
signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice
autonomy. Given the hidden costs of control,
principals earn more if they trust their agents
than if they control. Most of the principals in
our experiment seem to understand the adverse
effect of control. The majority decides not to
restrict the agent’s choice set but to trust that the
agent will perform well voluntarily. Principals
who control hold more pessimistic beliefs about
the agent’s performance than principals who
trust. As agents’ behavior roughly confirms
both types of beliefs, our results nicely support
the so-called “self-fulfilling prophecy of dis-
trust” (Niklas Luhmann, 1968).1
We conducted several control treatments
both to test the robustness of our results and to
isolate the precise impact of control on agents’
motivation. In one of these treatments, the con-
straint x is given exogenously, i.e., the agent’s
choice set is identical to that in the main exper-
iment when the principal decides to control.
Since it is not the principal who implements x,
however, distrust and control are not at issue in
this treatment. Assuming that the principal’s
controlling decision is behaviorally relevant to
the agent, if the principal decides to control in
the main treatment, x should be lower than that
in the control treatment. This is what we find. In
a further treatment, we embed the principal’s
control decision in a standard gift-exchange
game. A principal in this treatment not only
decides whether to control his agent but also
determines his agent’s wage. In line with pre-
vious studies, we find that agents’ x-choices are
generally increasing in the wage payment, i.e.,
agents act reciprocally to the principal’s wage
choice. Yet, if the principal controls, the agent’s
reciprocal inclination is lower than if the prin-
cipal does not control. The result shows that
even if the principal can use additional instru-
ments to motivate the agent, control continues
to have a negative impact on agents’ perfor-
mance. To further test the robustness of our
findings, we conducted a questionnaire where
subjects were asked to state their work motiva-
tion in various everyday workplace scenarios.
Similar to our lab evidence, we find that self-
reported work motivation varies significantly
with the extent to which agents are exposed to
control.
Taken together, our results show that the use of
control and explicit incentives entails “hidden
costs” that should be considered when designing
employment contracts and workplace environ-
ments. Elements in the labor contract that can be
perceived as signals of distrust and control, such
as minimum performance requirements, may
harm more than help. Similarly, characteristics of
the workplace environment that limit freedom of
choice and signal low expectations, such as high
levels of monitoring and surveillance, may be
equally counterproductive.
In fact, the hidden costs of control offer a
1 The intuition of our results is neatly captured by an
example reported by David Packard, one of the founders of
the computer company Hewlett-Packard (HP). Packard
notes in his memoirs: “In the late 1930s, when I was
working for General Electric ... , the company was making
a big thing of plant security. ... GE was especially zealous
about guarding its tool and parts bins to make sure employ-
ees didn’t steal anything. Faced with this obvious display of
distrust, many employees set out to prove it justified, walk-
ing off with tools and parts whenever they could. ... When
HP got under way, the GE memories were still strong and I
determined that our parts bins and storerooms should al-
ways be open. ... Keeping storerooms and parts bins open
was advantageous to HP in two important ways. From a
practical standpoint, the easy access to parts and tools
helped product designers and others who wanted to work
out new ideas at home or on weekends. A second reason,
less tangible but important, is that the open bins and store-
rooms were a symbol of trust, a trust that is central to the
way HP does business” (David Packard, 1995, p. 135).
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psychological rationale for the incompleteness
of many real-life economic contracts. In this
sense, our paper offers a contribution to the liter-
ature on incomplete contracts. The degree of con-
tractual incompleteness is an economic puzzle.
Real-life contracts often omit important, verifiable
obligations of the contracting parties (or only
mention them vaguely), and measurable actions
are often linked to verifiable information in a
manner that is seemingly less than optimal. While
bounded rationality on the part of the contracting
parties might account for some of this incomplete-
ness, the key question is why many contracts
appear to be left incomplete deliberately. Several
explanations have been offered to answer this
question. In some situations, for example, incom-
plete contracts may be completed by renegotiation
design to achieve first-best outcomes, i.e., there is
no need to write more complicated contracts (Phil-
ippe Aghion et al., 1994; Georg No¨ldeke and
Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995). In other cases, incom-
plete contracts may actually be superior to more
complete contracts. Franklin Allen and Douglas
Gale (1992) and Kathryn E. Spier (1992), for
example, argue that offering a more complete
contract may lead the other party to draw negative
inferences about the first party’s type. B. Douglas
Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998) show
in a repeated game setting that if some obligations
are noncontractible, it may be better to leave other
aspects unspecified, giving rise to so-called “stra-
tegic ambiguity” in the design of the contract. Our
study provides a behavioral rationale for the de-
liberate incompleteness of many real-life con-
tracts. We show that a large fraction of agents are
averse to being controlled, and consequently
lower their performance if the principal imple-
ments a more complete contract. If the principal
anticipates this effect, he may be better off choos-
ing a less complete contract, leaving the agent
substantial discretion and thereby signaling the
principal’s trust in the agent’s nonopportunistic
behavior.
Our paper also contributes to the recent litera-
ture dealing with the interaction of psychological
and economic incentives (e.g., Bruno S. Frey,
1997; Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, 2000a, b;
Frey and Reto Jegen, 2001; Gneezy, 2004). The
analysis differs, however, in several dimensions
with respect to previous studies that have demon-
strated dysfunctional effects of explicit incentives.
First, principals in our experiment have a new and
yet unexplored decision possibility. Rather than
specifying punishments and rewards, a principal
in our game can determine the agent’s choice set
by fixing a positive minimum performance re-
quirement. These possibilities are common in
many real-life labor relations (regulated working
times, high-control working environments, mini-
mum output/quality, etc.) but, to the best of our
knowledge, have not yet been explored in a prin-
cipal-agent framework. In addition, our experi-
mental design carefully separates control and trust
from payoff-driven reciprocity and gift exchange.
In contrast to previous experiments (Ernst Fehr
and Simon Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and Bettina Rock-
enbach, 2003; Fehr and John A. List, 2004) it does
not pay for the principal to trust in our model
because trusting results in a higher payoff to the
agent which is reciprocated. Instead, trust pays in
our experiment only because some agents are in-
trinsically trustworthy and react negatively to the
implementation of control. A further distinction of
our paper is that we are able to obtain individual-
level information on the agent’s behavior rather
than aggregate results alone. In particular, we can
analyze agents’ heterogeneity with regard to their
behavioral motivation by distinguishing between
agents who react positively, neutrally, and nega-
tively to control. Finally, our study highlights pre-
viously untested mechanisms for possible dys-
functional effects of incentives. Earlier studies
have shown that incentives may undermine moti-
vation because they provide new information re-
garding the importance or the cost of the task
(Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a; Roland Be´nabou
and Jean Tirole, 2003), because they insult the
agent (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b), or because
they are in conflict with social norms of fairness
and cooperation (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr
and Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and List, 2004; see
also the discussion in Gneezy, 2004).
Since our results provide empirical evidence
for negative effects of control, our paper is also
closely related to Frey (1993), who proposes a
theoretical framework for analyzing the (possi-
bly negative) effects of monitoring on agents’
work effort. Two recent theoretical papers that
investigate the optimal monitoring of heteroge-
nous agents are Dirk Sliwka (2003) and Andrea
Ichino and Gerd Mu¨hlheusser (2004).2
2 Harry G. Barkema (1995) is the only empirical study
we know of that analyzes how monitoring affects workers’
effort, where the latter is measured by the number of work-
1613VOL. 96 NO. 5 FALK AND KOSFELD: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CONTROL
The paper is organized as follows. Details of
the experimental design are explained in the
following section. Section II discusses the be-
havioral predictions. Our main results are pre-
sented in Section III. Section IV reports data
from the gift-exchange experiment. Finally, in
Section V we present the results from a ques-
tionnaire illustrating the applications and
economic importance of the hidden costs of
control for real-life labor relations. Section VI
concludes.
I. Experimental Design
A. Main Treatments
Our design philosophy was to set up an ex-
perimental game that allows studying the poten-
tial interaction between control and motivation
in a parsimonious way. We therefore imple-
mented the following two-stage principal-agent
game. The agent chooses a productive activity
x, which is costly to him but beneficial for the
principal. The cost for the agent is c(x)  x,
while the benefit for the principal is 2x; i.e., the
marginal cost of providing the productive activ-
ity is always smaller than the marginal benefit.
The agent has an initial endowment of 120,
while the endowment of the principal is 0. The
payoff functions are thus given by p  2x for
the principal and a  120  x for the agent.
The crucial feature of our design is the princi-
pal’s choice. Before the agent decides on x, the
principal determines the agent’s choice set. He
can either restrict the agent’s choice set, in
which case the latter can choose any integer
value x  {x, x  1, ... , 120}, or he can leave
the choice set unrestricted to x  {0, 1, ... ,
120}. The parameter x varies across treatments
(see below). Thus, the principal can control the
agent’s decision environment, thereby guaran-
teeing a minimal payoff of 2x, or he can leave
the decision completely up to the agent, trusting
that the latter will not choose x below x.
We conjecture that the impact of control de-
pends on the level of control, which is measured
by the parameter x in our game. If x is low, for
example, the positive effect of control is likely
to be marginal; the hidden costs of control on
the other hand (if they exist) may be substantial.
As x increases, by definition the positive effect
of control rises, since agents cannot choose be-
low x. In consequence, it may turn out that the
overall net effect of control is actually non-
monotonic. For low levels of x, control might
generate a lower payoff than no-control; as x
rises, the payoff from control increases; even-
tually, control breaks even.3 To see whether this
hypothesis is correct, we implemented a low, a
medium, and a high control treatment. In the
low control treatment (C5), the principal can
only force the agent to choose x  5. He is able
to enforce twice as much, i.e., x  10, in the
medium control treatment (C10). Finally, he
can enforce a minimum of x  20 in the high
control treatment (C20). We made use of the
strategy method to elicit the agents’ choices in
the experiment in each of these treatments. Be-
fore knowing their principal’s actual decision,
the agents had to decide on x for both possible
cases. On a computer screen, they were asked to
choose x  {x, x  1, ... , 120} in case their
principal forces them to choose at least x, and to
choose x  {0, 1, ... , 120} in case their princi-
pal does not restrict their choice set. We used
the strategy method to gain direct information
about individual types, which will be discussed
in detail below.
B. Control Treatments
We also ran several control treatments to
check for the robustness, for possible interpre-
tations, as well as for the validity of our results
in a more general economic setting. The me-
dium control treatment C10 serves as the main
basis of comparison for all these treatments.
Our first control treatment (SR10) tests
whether agents’ behavior depends on the strat-
egy method as an elicitation procedure. If the
experience of being controlled is emotionally
ing hours. The study uses data from 116 executives of
medium-sized Dutch firms. While the author finds that
higher monitoring actually correlates with fewer working
hours in some cases, the causal relationship between the two
variables is unclear. A related literature in social psychology
comes from Thane S. Pittman et al. (1980), Mark R. Lepper
and David Green (1975), Robert Plant and Richard M. Ryan
(1985), and Michael E. Enzle and Sharon C. Anderson
(1993). None of these papers studies control in a principal-
agent relation, however.
3 Gneezy (2004) provides recent evidence for the non-
monotonicity of incentives in a proposer-responder game.
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important, it may well be that the aversion
against control is even stronger if agents decide
after having learned whether they are controlled
or not. On the other hand, it may be that the
strategy method places too much emphasis on
the control-versus-trust decision, thereby induc-
ing agents to overstate their dislike for control.
To rule out the possibility that our results are an
artifact of the strategy method, we therefore
applied the specific response method in treat-
ment SR10. Principals first set a minimum of
zero or x  10; then agents learn their princi-
pal’s choice before making their decision. In
consequence, each agent makes only one deci-
sion in this treatment—either under control or
under no control.
To test whether it is really the principal’s
control decision that affects agents’ motivation,
we implemented a second control treatment
where the constraint x  10 is given exog-
enously to the agent (EX10). In treatment
EX10, the principal and the agent play only the
subgame of the game in treatment C10 that
follows the restriction choice of the principal.
As before, the agent is endowed with 120
points. He chooses a productive activity x 
{10, 11, ... , 120}. Payoffs are 120  x for the
agent and 2x for the principal. The principal
makes no decision.
Finally, we explore the validity of our results
in a more general economic setting in a third
control treatment. The main advantage of our
simple principal-agent game is that it allows us
to study the hidden costs of control in a setting
uncluttered with other factors. The potential dis-
advantage is that it may exclude essential fea-
tures of employment relations that might be
relevant for the robustness of our results. In
practice, principals clearly do more than deter-
mine the agent’s choice set. Most importantly,
they also set the agent’s wage. To check
whether the introduction of wages has an impact
on the hidden costs of control, we implemented
a gift-exchange treatment (GE10) where the
principal not only determines the agent’s mini-
mum level of x, but also pays the agent a wage.
More precisely, in the first stage of treatment
GE10, the principal chooses a wage w  {10,
30, 60, 120} and decides whether to force the
agent to choose x  10. Depending on the
principal’s decision, the agent in the second
stage chooses x  {10, 11, ... , 120} if the
principal imposes control and x  {0, 1, ... ,
120} if the principal does not impose control in
the first stage. Payoffs are p  2x  w for the
principal and a  w  x for the agent. Note
that the game in treatment GE10 is a straight-
forward modification of our main principal-
agent game (C10), the only difference being
that players’ payoffs are now also determined
by the principal’s wage choice. We made use of
the strategy method to elicit agents’ choices in
this treatment; i.e., for each possible wage w
agents made a choice of x under both the con-
dition where the principal does and does not
implement a minimum of 10.
C. Procedural Details
Irrespective of the treatment, each principal-
agent game was played one-shot. All treatments
were framed in a neutral manner.4 All experi-
ments were computerized using the software
“z-Tree” (Urs Fischbacher, 1999) to run the
experiment. Subjects were randomly allocated a
role as principal or as agent upon arrival at the
lab. Subjects were students from the University
of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology in Zurich. A total of 804 subjects
participated in the experiment, half of them as
agents, the other half as principals. No subject
participated in more than one treatment. A total
of 140, 144, and 134 subjects participated in the
main treatments C5, C10, and C20, respectively;
246 subjects participated in treatment SR10. Fi-
nally, 72 subjects participated in treatment EX10
and 68 participated in treatment GE10. Each
session lasted, on average, between 40 and 50
minutes. On average, a subject earned CHF 25.11
(about $20) in the experiment.
D. Questionnaire Study
In addition to our experiment, we also con-
ducted a questionnaire to illustrate the variety of
applications and economic importance of the
hidden costs of control in typical real-life labor
relations. We used vignettes in the question-
naire where subjects were exposed to everyday
workplace scenarios. This allows changing con-
ditions along the control-trust dimension, hold-
4 In general, subjects were called “participant A” and
“participant B.” In the gift-exchange treatment participants
were called “employee” and “employer.” We avoided value-
laden terms like “trust” or “distrust.”
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ing the general workplace scenario constant. A
total of 403 subjects participated in the ques-
tionnaire study. None of these subjects partici-
pated in any treatment of the experiment. We
provide more information about the question-
naire in Section V.
II. Behavioral Predictions
The behavioral predictions for our experi-
ments depend on the assumptions concerning
players’ preferences. Let us consider the stan-
dard case first. If agents are selfish, i.e., only
interested in maximizing their own income,
they choose the minimum x. This implies that
they choose x  x if they are restricted and x 
0 otherwise. In consequence, principals who
want to maximize their payoffs should always
control the agent’s choice set. According to this
benchmark solution, agents are opportunistic
and therefore it inevitably pays to rule out their
most opportunistic choices.
There is ample evidence, however, that many
people do not act in a purely selfish manner, but
are endowed with social preferences (for an
overview of the experimental literature, see,
e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000, and Colin F. Cam-
erer, 2003). In the dictator game, for example,
proposers often give positive amounts of money
(Robert Forsythe et al., 1994; Alvin E. Roth,
1995). These findings were recently explained
in terms of subjects’ concern for equity and
efficiency (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Gary E.
Bolton and Axel Ockenfels, 2000; Gary Char-
ness and Matthew Rabin, 2002). In light of the
experimental evidence, and according to social-
preference theories, a substantial fraction of
agents in our principal-agent game are therefore
expected to choose an activity x that is strictly
larger than the respective minimum. If, how-
ever, the agent’s choice exceeds x (i.e., the
agent has a relatively strong preference for eq-
uitable outcomes), social-preference theories
imply that his choice is in fact independent of
whether a principal controls him or not. This
follows because, in these models, social prefer-
ences are based on payoff distributions and the
constraint x  x is not binding. Only agents
with a weak social preference, who choose 0 
x  x if not controlled, will choose a higher
performance (namely, x  x) if controlled.
Taken together, as it holds for the standard
economic case, a payoff-maximizing principal
cannot lose anything but can possibly gain
something from controlling agents with social
preferences, and hence should always restrict
the agent’s choice set.5
Now suppose that agents are intrinsically mo-
tivated to perform in the principal’s interest but
reduce their performance in response to being
controlled. A potential reason why we might see
this behavioral reaction is that controlling im-
plicitly signals that the principal does not expect
the agent to perform well. Some agents might
perceive this as a signal of distrust in their
intrinsic motivation; others might take it as an
indication of how much voluntary performance
the principal expects. In both cases, the agent
reacts by choosing a lower performance than he
would have chosen if the principal had not
controlled the agent. If faced with this type of
behavioral motivation, the optimal strategy for
the principal is thus the opposite of that de-
scribed above: a principal is better off trusting
and not controlling the agent. Of course, if the
enforceable level of control x is higher than
what the agent is willing to choose voluntarily,
controlling also pays if the agent is control
averse. Therefore, the payoff of controlling is
likely to be nonmonotonic. If x is relatively low,
trust pays; as x increases, control may become
the better strategy.
With regard to the exogenous-control treat-
ment EX10, note that both selfishness and social
preferences predict no difference in agents’ be-
havior between treatment EX10 and the sub-
game in treatment C10 that follows the
restriction decision. In contrast, if agents are
averse to control, x-choices should be higher in
5 Formally, according to the model of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), for example, inequity-averse agents choose either
x 0 if  1⁄3 or x 40 if  1⁄3 . In the first case, it pays
to control; in the second case, the agent’s choice is unaf-
fected. Choices other than 0 and 40 can be explained by
nonlinear versions of the model. Other existing theories of
social preferences are not only based on payoff distributions
but also take players’ intentions into account (Rabin, 1993;
Martin Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006). None of these theories, however, pre-
dicts that in equilibrium the principal refrains from control-
ling the agent’s choice set, and the agent chooses a lower x
if he is controlled than if he is not controlled by the prin-
cipal. The main reason is that if the principal’s decision not
to control the agent is perceived as a kind action (which
must be the case if the agent’s response is positive), con-
trolling must be even kinder, because the agent’s utility is
higher as his performance is lower.
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treatment EX10 than in the corresponding sub-
game of treatment C10. The reason is that while
the strategy set and the payoff consequences are
identical, the principal does not actively choose
the constraint x; instead, it is imposed exog-
enously in treatment EX10. Hence, the con-
straint cannot signal anything.
Finally, the principal also sets the agent’s wage
in the gift-exchange treatment GE10. Based on
results from previous studies (Fehr et al., 1993;
Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Gneezy,
2003), we expect reciprocity considerations to be-
come relevant in this treatment. That is, agents’
motivation to act in the principals’ interest should
increase with the wage payment. This hypothesis
is also in line with social-preference theories. As is
true for our main treatments, however, social-
preference theories predict that control is optimal
in the GE10 treatment because the controlling
decision does not affect agents’ reciprocity. In
contrast, if agents are averse to control, control
and reciprocity may interact in a nontrivial way. If
wages are low, even reciprocal agents will not
choose a high x. Therefore it pays for the principal
to control. For higher wages, however, control
may no longer be optimal. The reason is that by
setting a high wage and waiving control, the prin-
cipal unambiguously signals his kindness and his
trust in the agent’s performance. The implemen-
tation of control in this case, on the other hand,
signals less trust and kindness. In consequence,
the agent’s reciprocal inclination may be less pro-
nounced if the principal controls rather than trusts.
This may result in lower payoffs.
III. Main Results
In this section, we present the results from
our main treatments. We first report agents’
behavior on the aggregate and on the individual
level. We also show the robustness of our re-
sults with regard to the elicitation procedure.
We then turn to the principals. Finally, we dis-
cuss possible interpretations of our findings and
explore agents’ behavioral motives.
A. Agents’ Behavior
Our first result concerns the hidden costs of
control.
RESULT 1: We observe hidden costs of con-
trol in all main treatments (C5, C10, and C20).
Support for Result 1 comes from Figure 1A–
C. The figure shows how agents’ choices are
cumulatively distributed given the decision of
the principal in the three treatments. If there
were no hidden costs of control, the cumulative
distributions of agents’ choices, in case the prin-
cipal controls (black points), would coincide
with the cumulative distributions if the principal
does not control (white points) for all x  x.
Obviously, this is not the case in any of the
three treatments. For each value of x  x, there
are always strictly more agents in the no-control
condition who choose at least that value of x
than in the control condition. For example, 67
percent of the agents in treatment C5 (Figure
1A) choose x 10 when they are free to choose
voluntarily, and only 20 percent choose x  5.
In sharp contrast, only 30 percent choose x 10
if they are forced to choose at least 5, and 51
percent choose exactly the minimum x  5; 34
percent of the agents in this treatment choose
the payoff equalizing level of x  40 if they are
not controlled by the principal, yet only 9 per-
cent do so if they are controlled. A similar
picture emerges in treatments C10 and C20
shown in Figure 1B and 1C. Independent of the
level of x, we see relatively high x-choices from
the agents if they are in an uncontrolled envi-
ronment, whereas the mass of x-choices is cen-
tered at x if the principal restricts the agents’
choice set.
The shift in the distributions is highly signif-
icant in all three treatments. To test this, we
modify the distribution of x-choices in the no-
control case such that any observation x  x is
set equal to x. Under the assumption that control
has no behavioral impact, the resulting modified
distributions should be the same as the ones
generated by control. This can be rejected for all
treatments (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p 
0.001).6
While control entails hidden costs, by defini-
tion it may also generate benefits. Forcing
agents to choose at least x implies that any
choice below x is ruled out for sure. Our next
result shows how the costs and benefits translate
into profits.
6 We report the results of two-sided tests throughout the
paper.
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FIGURE 1. CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF AGENTS’ CHOICES IN TREATMENT C5 (PANEL A), C10
(PANEL B), AND C20 (PANEL C)
Notes: The figure shows all observations x 50. In each treatment, there were a few x-choices
above 50. These observations are summarized as x  50.
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RESULT 2: The hidden costs of control out-
weigh the benefits in all main treatments. Aver-
age performance is higher if the principal does
not control than if he does so. These differences
are significant in the C5 and the C10 treatment
but not in the C20 treatment.
Result 2 is supported by Table 1. Table 1
shows agents’ average and median performance
in our main treatments if the principal does and
does not restrict the agent’s choice set. This
table conveys a clear message. In all treatments,
both average and median performance levels are
higher in the no-control case than in the control
case. Depending on the level of x, the differ-
ences are actually quite large. In treatment C5,
agents make choices that are on average more
than twice as high if they are not controlled by
their principal than if they are controlled; in
treatment C10 average choices are 31 percent
higher. Median differences are even stronger.
As we have seen in Figure 1, if the principal sets
a minimum of x, more than half of the agents
choose exactly the minimum; hence median
performance equals 5, 10, and 20 in treatments
C5, C10, and C20 if the principal controls. The
median performance in case the principal trusts,
on the other hand, is 20, 20, and 30. These
performance differences are significant in the
C5 and the C10 treatment (Wilcoxon signed
rank test, p  0.001). Agents’ choices in the
C20 treatment are also slightly higher for prin-
cipals who trust, but not significantly so (Wil-
coxon signed rank test, p  0.957).
If we compare agents’ average performance
under control and no-control across the treat-
ments (i.e., for different levels of x), the data
reveal a further interesting finding. While the
enforceable level of control x plays a crucial
role if control is actually implemented, it plays
no important role if the principal decides to
trust. Agents do not behave differently if the
principal refrains from implementing a mini-
mum of x  5, compared to if he refrains from
implementing a minimum of 10, or 20 (Kruskal-
Wallis test, p  0.550). This suggests that
agents seem to punish the principal’s decision to
control rather than reward his decision to trust.
We will return to this issue in Section IIIC,
when we compare agents’ behavior to the data
from the exogenous-control treatment EX10.
Result 1 emphasizes the hidden costs of con-
trol caused by the existence of intrinsically mo-
tivated agents choosing a lower performance if
controlled than otherwise. Result 2 shows that
control also has some benefits, since selfish
agents are forced to choose a higher level of x if
they are controlled than if they are not con-
trolled. In the following, we provide more in-
formation about agents’ heterogeneity with
regard to their behavioral reaction to control.
Since we used the strategy method, we are able
to quantify how many agents reacted nega-
tively, positively, or in a neutral way, depending
on the principal’s decision.
RESULT 3: There is a strong heterogeneity
among the agents in all main treatments. We see
agents who react positively, neutrally, or nega-
tively to the principal’s implementation of con-
trol. The last group is always the majority.
Support for Result 3 comes from Table 2.
This table shows the absolute and relative fre-
quencies of agents who react positively, neu-
trally, or negatively to the implementation of
control in the three main treatments, together
with their average choices given the principal’s
decision. If all agents were selfishly motivated,
reactions would be positive, and the average
performance would equal x if controlled and
zero otherwise. Table 2 instead reveals that,
depending on the treatment, only between 20
and 37 percent of the agents show a positive
performance reaction to control. On average,
these agents choose slightly higher levels of x
than the required minimum. For the second
group of agents, the decision of the principal is
irrelevant in their choice of x. This group con-
sists of between 16 and 21 percent of the agents,
depending on the treatment. Finally, the largest
group in each of the three treatments consists of
individuals who show a negative response to
TABLE 1—AGENTS’ CHOICES DEPENDENT ON THE
PRINCIPAL’S DECISION
Treatment
C5 C10 C20
Principal controls Average 12.2 17.5 25.4
Median 5 10 20
Principal does not control Average 25.1 23.0 26.7
Median 20 20 30
Note: Number of observations: n  70(C5), n  72(C10),
n  67(C20).
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being restricted in their choice set; 64, 57, and
42 percent of the agents reveal this behavioral
pattern in treatments C5, C10, and C20, respec-
tively. They are responsible for why, on aver-
age, it does not pay for the principal to control.
Their average choice of x if controlled is 10.3,
18.7, and 21.5 for x equal to 5, 10, and 20,
respectively. If they can decide freely, on the
other hand, their average choice is 32.1, 32.3,
and 39.8.
In sum, our results show that the costs of
control are substantial. The results do not sug-
gest, however, that trust is always better than
control. In fact, they show that the hidden costs
and benefits of control depend on various fac-
tors. First, they depend on the relative frequency
of agents’ types. When the number of opportu-
nistic agents with a low intrinsic motivation to
perform is relatively high, controlling only gen-
erates minor costs and trusting is likely to be
suboptimal. Second, the level of the explicit
incentives is important. To illustrate, compare
the principals’ average profits in the C5, C10,
and C20 treatments. In the C5 treatment, con-
trolling lowers the motivation of many agents,
while the benefits of control are relatively small
given the little enforcement power of x  5. As
a consequence, the difference in average profits
between controlling and trusting amounts to
24.4  50.2  25.8. Controlling also lowers
motivation in the C10 treatment, but the en-
forcement power is stronger. As a result, the net
benefit of control is now 35.0  46.0  11.0.
Finally, in the C20 treatment there are again
negative effects of control, but due to the much
stronger enforcement power, average profits
differ insignificantly (50.8 53.42.6). We
suspect that control will outperform trust for
even higher levels of x. In this sense, our results
suggest that the relation between the principal’s
payoff and the strength of incentives is indeed
nonmonotonic: if the principal has only weak
incentives at his disposal, it may be better to
trust, since controlling lowers motivation of the
intrinsically motivated agents but increases the
performance of opportunistic agents only mar-
ginally. As controlling technologies and en-
forcement power increase in strength, however,
the disciplining effect eventually dominates the
negative effect on motivation.
Before we turn to the principals, we test the
robustness of our results with regard to the
elicitation of agents’ behavior. We elicited
agents’ choices with the help of the strategy
method in treatments C5, C10, and C20. This
was predominantly done to enable us to study
potentially different types of agents (Result
3). To rule out the possibility that agents’
behavior is an artifact of the strategy method,
we conducted a control treatment (SR10),
where we used the specific response method
instead. In this treatment, agents decided only
after having learned of the principal’s deci-
sion. Our results do not indicate any effect of
using the strategy method versus the specific
response method in our context. The average
(median) choice of an agent is 23.6 (20) if the
principal does not implement a minimum
level of 10 in the specific response treatment.
Using the strategy method, we get an average
(median) of 23.0 (20). These differences are
not significant (Mann-Whitney test, p 
0.822). If the principal decides to set a min-
imum of 10, the average (median) is 19.6
(10.5) if we use the specific response method,
and 17.5 (10) in the strategy method. Again,
there is no significant difference (Mann-Whitney
test, p  0.589). Finally, the hidden costs of
control, i.e., the difference in the distributions
between the control and the no-control con-
TABLE 2—HETEROGENEITY OF AGENTS’ BEHAVIORAL REACTION TO CONTROL
Treatment
C5 C10 C20
Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative
Number of agents 14 11 45 18 13 41 25 14 28
Relative share 0.20 0.16 0.64 0.25 0.18 0.57 0.37 0.21 0.42
Average x if controlled 10.2 22.3 10.3 11.1 22.7 18.7 21.9 39.4 21.5
Average x if not
controlled
4.8 22.3 32.1 1.9 22.7 32.3 4.9 39.4 39.8
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dition, are significant in the SR10 treatment
as well (Mann-Whitney test, p  0.007).7
B. Principals’ Behavior
We now turn to the principals. Given the
average responses of the agents, it is clearly not
optimal for payoff-maximizing principals to
control their agent, in particular in treatments
C5 and C10. Our next result shows that princi-
pals seem to have understood this.
RESULT 4: The majority of the principals
chooses not to control the agent.
Support for Result 4 comes from Table 3,
which reports the principals’ decisions. In all
treatments, the majority of principals decides to
trust rather than to control. The differences are
largest in the C5 treatment, where only 26 per-
cent of the principals control and 74 percent
trust. The respective numbers are 29 and 71
percent in the C10 treatment. These differences
are statistically significant for both treatments at
any conventional level (Binomial test, p 
0.001 in each treatment). The data suggest that
principals anticipate possible adverse effects of
controlling their agents because they voluntarily
give up the option to guarantee 2x points for
themselves. The differences are smallest and
insignificant in the C20 treatment, where
roughly half of the principals controlled while
the other half did not. In light of the perfor-
mance levels actually chosen, these results
make sense: the larger the payoff differences
between trusting and controlling, the larger is
the fraction of principals who trust.
The results shown in Table 3 suggest that
even though a majority of principals chose an
optimal strategy, some did not. This raises the
question why some of the principals chose to
control while others trusted. To better under-
stand the principals’ decisions, we study prin-
cipals’ beliefs. These beliefs were elicited right
after principals had made their decision. In all
treatments, we asked them to state their expec-
tation about the agent’s choice of x.8 In the C5
and the C20 treatments, we also asked them
about their counterfactual beliefs, i.e., what
those principals who controlled think they
would have gotten had they not controlled, and
vice versa. The main finding is summarized in
our next result.
RESULT 5: Principals who control have lower
expectations about x than principals who do
not. Expectations coincide with agents’ average
performance in most of the cases.
Principals’ beliefs are displayed in Table 3.
Principals who control expect to get less than
those who trust in all main treatments. In the C5
treatment, e.g., principals expect to receive on
average 17.8 if they control and 29.6 if they
trust. Similarly, principals who control expect
19.4 and 25.3 on average in treatments C10 and
C20, whereas their trusting counterparts in the
same situation expect on average 25.7 and 34.1.
The differences in beliefs are statistically signif-
icant in each of the treatments (Mann-Whitney
7 As above, we account for the difference in the support
of x by setting each observation x  10 in the no-control
case equal to 10. 8 Beliefs were not paid.
TABLE 3—PRINCIPALS’ BEHAVIOR AND BELIEFS
Treatment
C5 C10 C20
Control Trust Control Trust Control Trust
Relative share 0.26 0.74 0.29 0.71 0.48 0.52
Average belief of x 17.8 29.6 19.4 25.7 25.3 34.1
Average counterfactual belief of x 12.8 14.9 — — 10.3 23.0
Average x actually chosen 12.2 25.1 17.5 23.0 25.4 26.7
Are beliefs “correct”? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: Counterfactual beliefs were elicited only in treatments C5 and C20. Beliefs are “correct” if the Mann-Whitney test does
not reject the hypothesis that actual choices and corresponding beliefs are the same (p  0.1).
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test, p  0.007). The result suggests that prin-
cipals share different views about their agents’
cooperativeness. Those who trust are rather op-
timistic, while those who control seem to be
rather pessimistic. It is necessary to consider
also principals’ counterfactual beliefs, however,
in order to substantiate this claim. Do those
principals who control expect to receive less if
they trust, and vice versa? The answer is affir-
mative. In both the C5 and the C20 treatments,
principals who think that they get more if they
control than if they trust choose to control, and
vice versa. This implies two things. First, prin-
cipals act rationally conditional on their beliefs.
Second, there are in fact two types of principals.
Those who are optimistic believe that trust pays,
while those who are pessimistic expect control
to be the better strategy.9
A comparison of the principals’ expectations
with agents’ actual choices reveals that expec-
tations are indeed quite accurate. For example,
principals who control in treatment C10 expect
to get 19.4 on average when they in fact earn
17.5. At the same time, principals who trust in
this treatment expect on average 25.7, and in-
deed they receive 23.0. Table 3 shows that
principals’ expectations are in general a bit
higher than agents’ actual performance. With
the exception of the principals who trust in
treatment C20, however, a Mann-Whitney test
does not reject the hypothesis that beliefs and
actions are the same both if principals do not
control and if they do so (p  0.13 in each of
these cases). In the C20 treatment, principals
who trust expect to receive 34.1 but in fact they
get only 26.7 (Mann-Whitney test, p  0.071).
This optimism might have been due to the ex-
pectation that not choosing to control if one
could have enforced a relatively high amount
will be rewarded by particularly high choices of
x. Apparently, this is not the case. We will
return to this issue in the following section.
In our experiment, the principals’ beliefs and
the agents’ actual performance illustrate what
has been called the “self-fulfilling prophecy of
distrust” (Luhmann, 1968). Principals who have
rather pessimistic beliefs and hence choose to
restrict the agent’s choice set experience that
their beliefs are indeed confirmed by their
agents’ relatively low average performance. On
the other hand, principals who have optimistic
beliefs and trust their agents see their beliefs
roughly confirmed as well. In consequence, dif-
ferent and reinforcing “firm cultures” may
emerge. Managers in low-trust firms, on the one
hand, have little trust in their employees and
predominantly rely on control. These managers
will not be surprised to see performance at the
minimum, confirming their pessimistic beliefs.
The locked storeroom policy of General Electric
in the 1930s is a perfect example for such firm
culture (see footnote 1). High-trust firms, on the
other hand, are governed by the expectation of
mutual trust. Employees are trusted in these
firms and given responsibility. This “empower-
ment” of agents actually produces nonminimal
performance, substantiating the initial beliefs
held by the managers.
C. Exploring Agents’ Motives: What Drives
the Hidden Costs of Control?
In the preceding section we showed that
control has an adverse effect on many agents’
performance. We now explore possible inter-
pretations of this finding. We first present
results of the EX10 treatment that allows
checking whether the control decision of the
principal really drives our results in the main
treatments. Second, we examine whether
agents’ beliefs about the principal’s expecta-
tions play a role in agents’ behavior. Finally,
we report agents’ answers to a free-form
questionnaire, in which they were asked to
describe their emotional perception of being
controlled by the principal.
Strategy Space versus Control Decision.—In
principle, the negative effect of control in our
main treatments could be due to the mere dif-
ference in the agents’ strategy space, i.e., to the
difference in the support of x between the con-
trol and the no-control condition. To isolate the
effect of the principal’s control decision, we
compare agents’ choices in the subgame that
follows the control decision in treatment C10
9 Interestingly, both types of principals agree in their
expectations about agents’ behavior in case of control. If we
compare the beliefs of principals who control with the
counterfactual beliefs of principals who trust (treatments C5
and C20), a Mann-Whitney test does not reject the hypoth-
esis that beliefs are the same (p  0.4 in both treatments).
The actual difference between principals arises when it
comes to their expectation about agents’ performance in
case they are trusted.
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with agents’ choices in treatment EX10 where
subjects play only this subgame. Agents’ strat-
egy space is identical (10 to 120) in both situ-
ations. In the subgame of treatment C10,
however, the principal decided to control the
agent; in treatment EX10, x is imposed exog-
enously, i.e., any control decision of the princi-
pal is absent. If the controlling decision of the
principal generates the negative effect, the x-
choices in the EX10 treatment should exceed
those in the C10 subgame following the control
decision. This is what we find. If agents are
exogenously constrained to choose x  x  10,
the average (median) choice of an agent is 28.7
(20) compared to 17.5 (10) if the principal im-
plements the same restriction endogenously.
These differences are statistically significant
(Mann-Whitney test, p  0.001). At the same
time, there is no significant difference between
agents’ choices in the EX10 treatment and
agents’ choices in the subgame of the C10 treat-
ment when the principal trusts, i.e., does not
impose control (Mann-Whitney test, p 
0.523).10 Thus, agents’ behavior is indeed a
reaction to the principal’s decision to control.11
Moreover, since the average performance in the
trust subgame of the C10 treatment is not higher
than in the EX10 treatment, it seems that agents
punish the principal’s controlling decision
rather than rewarding his decision to trust. This
is also in line with our finding from the main
treatments showing that agents do not respond
differently to the waiving of different levels of
control x (see Table 1).
Agents’ Beliefs about Principals’ Expecta-
tions.—The fact that agents react to the princi-
pal’s decision suggests that the latter may
provide a signal—for example, a signal about
his expectations concerning the agent’s perfor-
mance. Recall that principals who control have
lower expectations than principals who trust
(Result 5). If agents understand this, it seems
plausible that agents differ in their belief about
the principal’s expectations: agents who are
controlled probably believe that the principal
has lower expectations with regard to x com-
pared to agents who are free to choose volun-
tarily. Moreover, agents’ beliefs are likely to
affect their behavior. Charness and Dufwenberg
(2004), for example, provide evidence that guilt
aversion is an important motive in principal-
agent relations. Agents who believe that the
principal has low expectations may feel less
“guilty” when choosing a low x than agents who
believe that the principal has high expectations.
In consequence, low expectations generate low
performance. At the same time, the agent can
also interpret low expectations in the sense that
the principal distrusts him to perform well. If
the agent doesn’t like to be distrusted, because
he regards himself as a trustworthy person, the
principal’s low expectations similarly reduce
the agent’s performance. In order to check
whether agents’ beliefs play a role, we asked
agents the following question in the control
treatment SR10, where we used the specific
response method: “What do you think were the
expectations of participant B (principal) con-
cerning your transfer decision?”12 The question
was asked directly after the agent had made his
decision. The results are as follows. The aver-
age (median) belief of an agent who is forced to
choose x  10 is 26.1 (30) compared to 35.9
(40) if the agent is free to choose voluntarily
(Mann-Whitney test, p  0.075). Thus, agents
who are controlled think that the principal has
lower expectations than do agents who are not
controlled. To test whether beliefs also affect
agents’ behavior, we ran a linear regression of
agents’ transfers on their beliefs, controlling for
the principal’s decision. The regression shows
that agents’ transfers and beliefs are signifi-
cantly and positively correlated (coef. 
0.2962, p  0.050). Thus, the less an agent
believes that his principal expects, the less he is
willing to perform in the principals’ interest.
Agents’ Emotional Perception of Control.—To
shed further light on agents’ perception of being
controlled by the principal, we asked all agents
in our main treatments—C5, C10, and C20—
10 Again, we account for the difference in the support of
x by setting each observation x  10 in the no-control case
equal to 10.
11 This result can be interpreted in terms of intention. In
a treatment where the outcome of a “decision” cannot be
attributed to the actor’s intention, reciprocal responses are
typically weaker (Sally Blount, 1995; Falk et al., 2000,
2003; Charness, 2004).
12 We asked this question only to the 52 agents who
participated in the last three sessions of treatment SR10.
Beliefs were not paid.
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the following question: “What do you feel if
participant B (principal) forces you to transfer at
least x points?” The question was asked after all
decisions in the experiment were made. An-
swers were given in free form. It turns out that
the answers can be organized in six categories:
distrust, lack of autonomy, greed, understand-
ing, neutral, and other.13 The fact that none of
the subjects mentions that he or she feels less
guilty about transferring a low x to the principal
was quite surprising to us. One possible reason
might be that the question was unfavorable to
check for guilt aversion. Had we asked a ques-
tion like: “What would you have felt if you had
transferred the lowest possible amount?,” we
speculate that we might have found guilt aver-
sion as an additional category. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of answers to our question
across the six categories for all subjects who
participated in the role of an agent in treatments
C5, C10, or C20 (data pooled over treatments,
n  209). The dark bars show the answers of
agents who reacted negatively to control, i.e.,
who chose a lower x when they were controlled
than when they were not controlled by the prin-
cipal (n  114). The light bars show the an-
swers of the remaining agents who either
reacted negatively or who made the same choice
of x in both conditions (n  95).
Let us first look at the agents who reacted
negatively to control in the experiment. Figure 2
shows that the emotional perception with the
highest frequency is distrust; 49 percent of the
agents who are willing to transfer a positive
amount say that they feel distrusted if the prin-
cipal forces them to transfer at least x, and that
they are hurt by this distrust in their voluntary
motivation.14 Next, a comparable number of
agents (48 percent) say that they feel a lack of
13 An answer was categorized as indicating “distrust” if
the subject explicitly mentioned a feeling of not being
trusted to transfer a positive amount. Category “lack of
autonomy” contains all answers, where the subject ex-
pressed a negative feeling of being restricted in his or her
freedom of choice. “Greed” represents answers where the
subject felt that the principal was a greedy or a petty person.
Categories “understanding” and “neutral” contain answers
where the subject said that he or she understands the prin-
cipal’s decision or where the subject did not express any
particular feeling, respectively. Finally, the category “other”
contains all answers that could not be classified into one of
the other categories. Note that answers may well fall into
more than one category. For example, a subject may men-
tion both a feeling of distrust and of a lack of autonomy. In
consequence, frequencies generally do not add up to one.
14 A typical response in this category reads, as one
subject puts it: “The fact that he does not trust me to transfer
enough points offends my pride.”
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Notes: Response to: “What do you feel if participant B (principal) forces you to transfer at
least x points?” (C5, C10, and C20; data pooled over treatments; n  209).
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autonomy and a reduced opportunity for deter-
mining the outcome at their own will,15 and 18
percent feel that the principal seems to be a
greedy or a petty person. Finally, only a minor-
ity (6 percent) expresses understanding for the
principal’s decision to restrict their choice set,
and none of the agents says that he or she feels
neutral.
In contrast, agents who do not react nega-
tively in the experiment mostly express their
understanding for the principal’s decision (41
percent); 16 percent do not express any partic-
ular feeling. Interestingly, many of these agents
also perceive the controlling decision of the
principal as a signal of distrust (27 percent) or
as a lack of autonomy (21 percent). Unlike the
previous group, however, these agents do not
lower their performance. Either they choose the
same value of x independent of the decision of
the principal, or they chose a higher x, mainly
because the controlling decision forces them to
do so. Apparently, the principal’s distrust in the
agent’s performance seems well justified in the
latter case.
In sum, our results indicate that the controlling
decision really matters. Agents seem to believe
that principals who control expect to get less than
those who don’t (which is correct, as Result 5
shows), and their beliefs positively correlate with
their behavior. When asked for their emotional
perception of control, most agents who react neg-
atively say that they perceive the controlling de-
cision as a signal of distrust or a limitation of their
choice autonomy.16
IV. Hidden Costs of Control in the
Gift-Exchange Game
The treatments we have discussed thus far are
extremely simple, which has the advantage of
allowing us to study hidden costs of control in a
setting uncluttered with confounding factors.
On the other hand, our setup abstracts from
many essential features of employment rela-
tions that are potentially relevant and that may
interact with hidden costs of control. Most im-
portantly, principals set wages in practice. Since
the payment of wages signals something about
the principal’s expectation about the agent’s
trustworthiness and willingness to work, wages
complicate the perception of control in a non-
trivial way. Therefore, in this section, we report
the results from our gift-exchange treatment
GE10. Recall from Section I that the principal
both chooses a wage w  {10, 30, 60, 120} and
decides whether to set a minimum x  10 in the
first stage of this treatment. Depending on the
principal’s decision, the agent in the second
stage chooses x  {10, 11, ... , 120} if the
principal imposes control and x  {0, 1, ... ,
120} if the principal does not impose control.
Payoffs are p  2x  w for the principal and
a  w  x for the agent.
The gift-exchange treatment GE10 is essen-
tially the same as our main treatment C10 but
allows principals to set wages. We therefore
expect reciprocity considerations on the side of
the agents to become relevant. Numerous gift-
exchange experiments similar to ours have
shown that agents provide efforts above the
contractually enforceable level, and that efforts
are, on average, increasing in the wage pay-
ment. The reason is that high wages are per-
ceived as kind or fair, and reciprocal workers
respond to this perceived kindness by providing
relatively high efforts (Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr et
al., 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Gneezy, 2003).
We therefore expect a positive relation between
x and the wage level in our gift-exchange treat-
ment. The interesting question, however, is how
the reciprocity motive interacts with the control
decision. Assume that the principal pays a low
wage of 10. In this case, a selfish agent chooses
x  0, but even a reciprocal agent will most
likely choose x  10. In fact, given the results
from previous gift-exchange experiments, the
highest x that is likely to be chosen is the one
that equates the payoff of the principal and the
agent, which equals x  20/3  10 if the wage
is 10. Thus, even in the presence of strongly
reciprocally motivated agents, x will be higher
if the principal controls than if he does not.
For higher wages, however, the optimality of
15 For example, one subject says, “If I feel to be forced
to do something, I am no longer willing to give more than
necessary. I give a little bit more than what is required,
because I want to make the decision myself and without any
influence from the outside.”
16 The importance of autonomy is consistent with recent
evidence, e.g., from the European Survey of Working Con-
ditions, showing that workplace flexibility has a strong
positive effect on workers’ job satisfaction and that this
effect is mainly driven by workers’ positive evaluation of an
increased autonomy over how to perform their tasks and the
opportunity to participate in decision-making (Thomas K.
Bauer, 2004).
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control versus trust depends on the interaction
between perceived kindness of high wages and
perceived unkindness of control. If a principal
sets a high wage and refrains from controlling,
he unambiguously signals his trust and the ex-
pectation of a high x. If he pays a high wage and
controls, however, the signal contains, on the
one hand, high expectations and kindness re-
sulting from the high wage and, on the other
hand, low expectations and distrust because of
the control decision. The next result shows that
reciprocal responses are in fact less pronounced
if the principal controls compared to if he trusts.
RESULT 6: We observe reciprocity in the gift-
exchange treatment, i.e., a positive relation be-
tween wages and x. Reciprocity is significantly
weaker, however, if the principal controls than
if he does not control.
Support for Result 6 comes from Figure 3.
The figure shows, for each wage, the median
values of x chosen by the agents. Both under
control and under no control, wages and x-
choices are positively correlated. This follows
from a simple regression where we regressed
performance on wages (with robust standard
errors, clustered on individuals). The perfor-
mance coefficient is positive and highly signif-
icant in both conditions (control condition:
coeff.  0.1909; no-control condition: coeff. 
0.2538; p  0.001 in both conditions). Figure 3
reveals that the principal’s controlling decision
again entails a hidden cost—this time by partly
crowding out agents’ reciprocity. As conjec-
tured, agents choose higher x levels for a wage
of 10 if they are controlled than otherwise. For
higher wages, however, the median values of x
are always higher if the principal does not con-
trol than if he does. Remember that in all our
main treatments the median of x is equal to x if
the principal controls. This holds also in the
gift-exchange treatment. As Figure 3 shows, the
median in the control condition is 10, indepen-
dent of the wage, indicating that the majority of
the agents choose exactly the minimum when
controlled. In the no-control condition, on the
other hand, median values increase in the wage,
reaching a level of 20 for wages equal to 120.
The resulting hidden costs are significant: if we
modify agents’ choice distributions such that
any observation x  x is set equal to x, the
distributions are significantly different for each
wage above the minimum wage 10 (Wilcoxon
signed rank test, p 0.01 for wages equal to 30,
60, or 120). Of course, there are also benefits
from controlling. The selfish agents who choose
x  10 if not controlled are forced to choose 10
if controlled. The net effect of costs and benefits
is displayed in the averages of x. For wages
equal to 10, 30, 60, and 120, averages are 10.7,
12.6, 19.1, and 31.0 if the principal controls and
5.0, 10.1, 20.9, and 32.6 if the principal does not
control. Thus, the hidden costs slightly out-
weigh the benefits for wages above 30, i.e., the
negative effect of control on reciprocal agents is
slightly stronger than the positive effect of con-
trol on the selfish agents.
The results from the gift-exchange treatment
reveal that control partly crowds out agents’
motivation to reciprocate high wages with high
performance levels. Interestingly, the principals
in this treatment again anticipate this. While
only 10 percent of the principals trust the agent
when paying a wage of 10 (n  10), 50 percent
of the principals trust for wages above 10 (n 
24). The number of principals who trust in-
creases significantly in the wage principals pay
(Spearman rank correlation, p 0.029, n 34).
This finding also corroborates the result that there
are pessimistic principals who decide to pay low
wages and to control, while the optimistic princi-
pals appeal to reciprocity by paying relatively high
wages and refrain from controlling.
V. Control at the Workplace:
Questionnaire Data
We added some “realism” in the previous
section by allowing principals to set wages. In
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FIGURE 3. HIDDEN COSTS OF CONTROL IN THE
GIFT-EXCHANGE GAME
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this section, we go much further and study how
control and explicit incentives affect motivation
in typical work environments. This section il-
lustrates the variety of applications of hidden
costs of control, as well as their economic im-
portance. Moreover, it shows that the results we
obtained in stylized principal-agent relations in
the lab carry over to quite realistic, everyday
workplace scenarios.
Our research tool is a questionnaire in which
we presented subjects with vignettes. We study
five different workplace “scenarios.” For each
of these scenarios, we present two “conditions,”
one where the principal trusts the employee, and
one where he controls or uses explicit incentive
devices. The description of a particular scenario
is identical for the two conditions. Each subject
goes through all five scenarios but the subject
goes through only one of the two conditions for
a given scenario. We ask each subject to indi-
cate his work motivation on a five-level scale
ranging from “very low” to “very high” for each
of the five scenarios/conditions.
Table 4 displays all scenarios and conditions:
in the first scenario, the employee works in a
supermarket and is responsible for checking the
balances in the cash registers. In principle, he
could easily take out money for himself but he
is assumed not to do so. In the trust condition
for this scenario, the principal does not check
the employee; in the control condition, the prin-
cipal controls whether the employee reported
the cash balances truthfully. In the second sce-
nario, the agent just started a new job and re-
ceives instructions about what he is expected to
do. The agent in the trust condition is asked to
meet his working time obligation exactly; in the
control condition, he has to sign a formal agree-
ment about his working time. The third scenario
is a job interview. The agent truthfully reports
on his qualifications and work experience. He
offers his previous employer as a reference,
who can verify his statements. In the trust con-
dition, the new employer believes what the
agent says and hires him; he hires him in the
control condition only after having consulted
the previous employer. In the fourth scenario,
the employee begins a new job in a small busi-
ness, where he is told that the copying machine
may not be used for private purposes. In the
trust condition, the room with the copying ma-
chine is open; in the control condition, the room
is locked and the employee has to ask his boss
for the key. Finally, the employee in the fifth
scenario works for a company that has recently
provided Internet access on all personal com-
puters, but this access may be used only for
business purposes. In the trust condition, the
management asks all employees to respect this
rule; in the control condition, the management
installs special software, which lists all Internet
sites the employees have visited.
Our vignette study had 403 subjects. Thus we
get a total of about 2,000 work motivation re-
sponses for the ten conditions (see Table 4). All
subjects are undergraduate students from the
University of Zurich. None of these subjects
participated in any of our experimental treat-
ments. The results in Table 4 resemble our
findings in the experiments. Signals of distrust
and control affect the agents’ motivation nega-
tively. For all work scenarios, the relative fre-
quencies of agents indicating that they have a
high or very high work motivation are always
lower in the control than in the trust condition.
For example, 71 percent of the subjects in the
trust condition of scenario 1 indicate a high or
very high work motivation. The number of
TABLE 4—“HOW HIGH IS YOUR WORK MOTIVATION?”
Work motivation
Scenario 1
(Supermarket)
Scenario 2
(Working times)
Scenario 3
(Job interview)
Scenario 4
(Locked door)
Scenario 5
(Internet)
Control Trust Control Trust Control Trust Control Trust Control Trust
Very low 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.02
Low 0.31 0.03 0.26 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.24 0.07 0.33 0.12
Medium 0.36 0.25 0.48 0.30 0.41 0.10 0.41 0.33 0.41 0.42
High 0.23 0.60 0.20 0.45 0.39 0.53 0.25 0.50 0.15 0.42
Very high 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.34 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.02
Number of
observations
199 204 204 199 203 197 199 203 203 199
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highly or very highly motivated subjects in the
control condition, however, who learn that their
principal controlled whether they checked the
cash balances truthfully, is only 26 percent. If
the principal believes the prospective employee
and hires him, 87 percent of the subjects report
a high or very high work motivation (scenario
3). The corresponding number drops to 44 per-
cent if the principal first checks the reference.
Scenario 4 mirrors the Hewlett-Packard exam-
ple in footnote 1: work motivation is much
higher if doors are open rather than locked.
Likewise, formal agreements about working
hours (scenario 2) or controlling employees’
Internet access (scenario 5) reduces motivation.
In all scenarios, control reduces work motiva-
tion significantly (Mann-Whitney test, p 
0.0001 for each of the five scenarios). Of
course, we cannot conclude from this result that
it would pay for the principal to trust his agent
rather than to control him. What these results do
show, however, is that there are hidden costs of
control: the agent’s work morale is dampened.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyze the interaction of
control and motivation in a principal-agent re-
lationship. We introduce a simple game, which
allows studying the potential impact of control
in a parsimonious way. Our results show that a
majority of the agents exhibits control-averse
behavior, i.e., they are less motivated to perform
well if the principal forces them to provide a
minimum level of performance. This also holds
in our gift-exchange treatment, where principals
can decide whether to control or trust the agent
and determine the agent’s wage payment. The
reciprocal relationship between wages and ef-
fort is weaker in the presence of control in this
treatment. Given the significant hidden costs of
control in all our treatments, it may not come as
a surprise to see that a majority of the principals
in our experiment decide, in fact, to trust rather
than to control their agent. The economic im-
portance and possible applications of our exper-
imental results are further illustrated by a
questionnaire which reveals hidden costs of
control in various real-life labor scenarios.
We also explore possible reasons for the ex-
istence of hidden costs of control. Agents cor-
rectly believe that principals who control expect
to get less than those who don’t. When asked
for their emotional perception of control, most
agents who react negatively say that they per-
ceive the controlling decision as a signal of
distrust and a limitation of their choice
autonomy.
The main message of our paper is that control
and explicit incentives entail hidden costs,
which should be taken seriously. The message
is not, however, that it is always better for
principals to trust than to control. In fact, we
show that the costs and benefits of controlling
agents depend on various factors. First, they
depend on the composition of agents’ types.
When facing rather opportunistic agents with a
low intrinsic motivation to perform in the inter-
est of the principal, controlling generates only
minor costs and trusting is likely to be subop-
timal. Second, the strength of the explicit incen-
tives is important. The results from our main
treatments reveal a nonmonotonic relation be-
tween agents’ performance and the strength of
incentives: if the principal has only weak incen-
tives at his disposal it is better to trust since
controlling reduces motivation of the intrinsi-
cally motivated agents but increases the perfor-
mance of opportunistic agents only marginally.
As incentives get stronger, however, the disci-
plining effect eventually dominates the negative
effect on motivation.
Our results suggest important implications
for the design of organizations. First, the poten-
tial gains from control have to be weighted in
light of the hidden costs of control (not to speak
of the explicit costs of installing control de-
vices). Faced with agents who have heteroge-
neous motivations, the key management goal is
to develop incentive contracts that discipline the
opportunistic agents without reducing the moti-
vation of the intrinsically motivated ones. Sec-
ond, when introducing incentives, the principal
should be careful not to signal a negative mes-
sage. Agents’ performance was much better in
the EX10 treatment, where control was imple-
mented exogenously, compared to the subgame
following the controlling decision of the princi-
pal. This finding corroborates, for example, the
important role of third parties like consultan-
cies, governments, etc., with regard to the im-
plementation of control and explicit incentives.
Third, our results from the gift-exchange game
suggest that it is a bad decision to trust and to
distrust at the same time. Paying low wages and
refraining from control is certainly dominated
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by low wages and control. On the other hand,
when paying high wages, controlling the agent
leads to a lower performance than not control-
ling the agent. It seems that principals have to
confess their “true” expectations: either to trust
or to control. Trusting a bit is likely to be
interpreted as not trusting at all.
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